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TARASOFF AND THE DILEMMA OF THE DANGEROUS PATIENT:
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE 1990's

Michael L. Perlin*
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most controversial aspects of the legal regulation of
mental disability practice is the so-called "duty to protect" that
stems from caselaw construing the California Supreme Court's
1976 decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California.'
Tarasoff held that, in certain limited circumstances, when a therapist determines (or should have determined) that her patient
presents a "serious danger of violence to another, [she] incurs a
duty to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against
such danger." 2 If she fails to do this, she may be liable for tort
damages. 3
Over the past fifteen years, the legend of the Tarasoff case has
grown to mythic proportions. The case has spawned a cottage industry of commentary: mental health professionals have attacked
it as a prime example of unwarranted "judicial intrusion" into psychotherapeutic practice;6 legal commentators have predicted that it
marked "the decline of effective psychotherapy; ' and empirical
surveyors have found that it has had a profound impact on mental
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B. Rutgers University, J.D.,
Columbia University Law School. This article is adapted from a paper presented
at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco,
CA, August 1991. The author wishes to thank Janice Lunde for her excellent research assistance, and Bob Sadoff, Steven Smith, Tony Alfieri and Douglas Mossman for their helpful comments and critique.
1. 551 P.2d 334 (1976). See generally 3 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§ 13.05-13.21 (1989).
2. Tarasoff v. Regents, 551 P.2d at 340.
3. Id. at 340-42.
4. See generally 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, at § 13.08; Ginger Mayor McClarren,
Note, The Psychiatric Duty to Warn: Walking a Tightrope of Uncertainty, 56 U.
CIN. L. REV. 269, 270 n.1 (1987).
5. Daniel J. Givelber et al., The Tarasoff Controversy: A Summary of Findings From an Empirical Study of Legal, Ethical and Clinical Issues, in THE PoTENTIALLY VIOLENT PATIENT AND THE TARASOFF DECISION IN PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE

35, 37 (James Beck ed. 1985).
6. Bruce Ackerman, Note, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California: The Duty to Warn: Common Law and Statutory Problems for California
Psychotherapists,14 CAL. W. L. REV. 153 (1978).
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health practice even in jurisdictions where it is inapplicable.7
Widely misunderstood,8 it remains the benchmark against which
all other litigation and statutory reform in this area is measured,9
as well as the subject of the most common questions directed to
the American Psychiatric Association's legal consultation service. 10
According to the most comprehensive empirical survey done on
Tarasoff awareness among mental health professionals, "it is a fair
guess that there is no other legal decision, with the possible exception of controversial cases such as Brown v. Board of Education,
which could command this level of recognition among a subgroup
of laypersons."1
Tarasoff has become shorthand for a variety of fact situations
and issues that transcend both the unique situation presented in
that case and the broader question of how liability should be imposed in cases where mentally disabled persons are litigational
"third parties," that is, where they are neither plaintiffs nor defendants but where it is alleged that their violent actions caused
the injury that led to the victim's suit against the therapist.2 Issues of confidentiality, informed consent, scope of insurability, patients' rights, predictivity of dangerousness, and limits on governmental intervention in psychotherapeutic practice have all been
considered through the Tarasoff filter in ways that should eventually help illuminate the core underlying issue: what must a therapist do when she believes that her patient or client is potentially
dangerous to a third party, and what implications does the resolution of this issue have for malpractice jurisprudence?
In the course of this article, I will consider this question in the
following way. First, I will briefly summarize Tarasoff and its progeny, try to articulate the direction in which post-Tarasoff cases appear to be headed, highlight some of the key questions that must
be asked in any potential Tarasoff setting, and review the scholarly
7. See Givelber, supra note 5, at 39-54.
8. See David J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical
Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 443, 466 (1984).
9. See 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 13.05, at 135.
10. James C. Beck, The Psychotherapist's Duty to Protect Third Parties
From Harm, 11 MENT. & PHYS. Dis. L. RPTR. 141, 147 (1987).
11. Givelber, supra note 8, at 457-58.
12. This use of the term is explained in 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 13.05, at
134 n.70.
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and practice-based critiques of the decisions. 3 Second, I will look
at the subject matter from the important-but rarely discussed-perspective of the forensic evaluator, will say a brief word
about the impact of Tarasoff on cases involving persons with
AIDS, and will consider how the Tarasoff doctrine fits (or does not
fit) with other important mental disability constructs such as the
right to treatment, the application of procedural and substantive
due process to the involuntary civil commitment setting, the application of the least restrictive alternative, the right to refuse treatment, and the bundle of civil rights surrounding outpatient commitment.14 Third, I will try to look at "new directions" in Tarasoff
developments in light of two important constructs: those cognitive
psychology devices (such as heuristics) through which we attempt
to simplify complicated information-processing tasks, and "therapeutic jurisprudence" (the investigation into the question of
whether legal rules impair or improve the functioning of the
mental disability system). In this context, I will focus specifically
on the relationships between Tarasoff, public perceptions of
Tarasoff, and malpractice litigation. Finally, I will conclude by
suggesting that, in order to "solve" the dilemma of the clinician's
obligation in dealing with the dangerous patient, we must look at
these latter concepts: the integration of Tarasoff with other jurisprudential doctrines; and the application of cognitive psychology/
therapeutic jurisprudence constructs.1 5
II.

TARASOFF, ITS PROGENY, AND ITS CRITIQUES

A.

The Tarasoff Case

The facts of Tarasoff are well-known. A University of California graduate student (Poddar) told his therapist that he intended
to kill Tatiana Tarasoff, a young woman whom he had previously
dated.' 6 The therapist consulted with his supervisor and then contacted the campus police who questioned Poddar and then released him once he promised to stay away from Ms. Tarasoff. .
Two months later, Poddar went to Ms. Tarasoff's home, and killed
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra text accompanying notes 16-72.
See infra text accompanying notes 73-141.
See infra text accompanying notes 142-96.
Tarasof[,551 P.2d at 339. See also People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342 (1974).
Id. at 339-40.
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her.' 8 Subsequently, her parents filed suit on a variety of tort theories, including the failure on the part of Poddar's therapists to
warn them that Poddar was a "grave danger" to their daughter. 29
2
In its rehearing in the case, " the California Supreme Court '
found a "duty to protect" (rather than a "duty to warn"), and
held:
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of
his profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to
use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such
danger. The discharge of this duty may require the therapist to
take one or more of various steps, depending upon the nature
of the case. Thus it may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to nosteps are reasonably
tify the police, or to take whatever other
2
necessary under the circumstances.2

In answering the question of whether a plaintiff would be entitled to legal protection against a defendant's conduct in such a
case, the court sought to balance the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff, the degree of certainty that she would suffer injury, the
closeness of the connection between defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's injury, the moral blameworthiness attached to the defendant's conduct, and the potential consequences to the commu18. See generally People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342 (1974).
19. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340 (listing causes of action).
20. In its initial decision, the California Supreme Court had found that a
psychotherapist was under a duty to warn when, "in the exercise of his professional skill and knowledge, [he] determines, or should determine, that a warning
is essential to avert danger arising from the medical or psychological condition of
his patient." Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 555 (1974), modified, 551 P.2d 334 (1976). The Court reheard the case at the request of the American Psychiatric Association and other professional organizations. Mark J. Mills &
James Beck, The Tarasoff Case, in THE POTENTIALLY VIOLENT PATIENT AND THE
TARASOFF DECISION IN PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 1, 4-5 (James Beck ed. 1985); see
also Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient:Implications
of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263, 294 n.70 (1982).
21. The decision was a split one. Justice Mosk concurred in part and dissented in part, stressing that his partial concurrence was premised on the fact
that the defendant therapist did predict that Poddar would kill Tatiana.
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 353. Justice Clark dissented, warning that the majority's

rule "is certain to result in a net increase in violence." Id. at 355. See also infra
text accompanying notes 100-01.
22. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340.
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In such cases, liability will only lie where the defendant
bears a "special relationship" to the dangerous person. 24 The therapist-patient relationship satisfies this test.2 6
The court rejected the argument that mental health professionals' inability to accurately predict dangerousness should insulate them from liability," and stressed that the alleged failure here
was not in the accuracy of prediction (as the therapist did contact
the campus police) but in the failure to warn once the prediction
was made.27 While it was possible that unnecessary warnings might
be given, that risk was "a reasonable price to pay for the lives of
possible victims that may be saved. '2 8 Finally, the court rejected
defendants' argument that confidentiality concerns barred the issuance of warnings. Looking both at the patient's interest in privacy and the public's interest in safety, the court concluded that
"the public policy favoring protection of the confidential character
of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The
protective privilege ends where the public peril begins. "29
B.

Subsequent Decisions

Subsequent decisions from other jurisdictions have been far
from unanimous in their interpretation of Tarasoff.30 Some have
adopted its holding, 31 some have extended its reach,32 others have
limited it, 3 3 while yet others have simply declined to follow it.34
Courts have extended the Tarasof duty where the victim was the
young child of a threatened victim, 35 where the foreseeable violence might involve a "class of persons at risk,"36 and, in one case,
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 342.
Id. at 343; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343-44.
Id. at 346.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 347.
3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 13.09, at 151.
Id. §§ 13.10-13.11.

TORTS,

§ 315 (1977).

32. Id. § 13.12.
33. Id. §§ 13.13-13.16.

34. Id. § 13.17.
35. Hedlund v. Superior Court of Orange County, 669 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1983);
PERLIN, supra note 1, § 13.12, at 159-60 n.269 (discussing Hedlund).
36. 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 13.12 at 160; see also Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck

see 3
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to anyone who might foreseeably be endangered by the patient in
question. 37 In the broadest extensions, one case extended the potential class of defendants (to include all "mental health professionals," not simply psychiatrists and psychologists) as well as the
type of injury involved (to include property damages where the patient burned down his parents' barn). 38 Another case held that a
doctor might be liable for failing to warn of medication side-effects
if those side-effects should have led him to caution the patient
against driving where it was foreseeable that an accident could
result. 3
Courts have distinguished Tarasoff in a variety of cases. Most
have involved fact settings where the victim was neither identified
nor identifiable. 40 Similar results were reached where: the therapist
lacked sufficient control over the patient in question;"' the therapist could have reasonably believed that the patient's fantasies did
not pose a danger to an identifiable victim;4 2 the foreseeable victim
had pre-existing knowledge of the patient's potential danger;43 a
separate statutorily-created privilege protected the therapist from
disclosing the patient's actual confidential communication;"" by the
time of the disclosure, the communication was no longer confiden& Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
37. Petersen v. Washington, 671 P.2d 230 (Wash. 1983); see 3 PERLIN, supra
note 1, § 13.12, at 160-61 n.271 (discussing Petersen).
38. Peck v. Counseling Service of Addison County, 499 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1985).
Peck is criticized sharply in Alan Stone, Vermont Adopts Tarasoff: A Real BarnBurner, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 352 (1986). Compare Bellah v. Greenson, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 92, 94-95 (1977) (refusing to extend Tarasof to cases involving property,
damage or suicide).
39. Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. 1988). Schuster is characterized as "the current apex of Tarasof's legal maturation." For an indication of
expanding liability following Tarasoff, see Steven C. Bednar, Note, The Psychotherapist's Calamity: Emerging Trends in the Tarasoff Doctrine, 1989 B.Y.U. L.
REV.

261 (1989).

40. See, e.g., Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 (1980), and see
generally 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 13.14, at 164-65 (listing cases).
41. See, e.g., Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999, 1009 (D. Md. 1982);
Lindsey v. United States, 693 F. Supp. 1012, 1024 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
42. White v. United States, 780 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
43. Moye v. United States, 735 F. Supp. 179, 181 (E.D.N.C. 1990); see also
Rogers v. S.C. Dept. of Mental Health, 377 S.E. 2d 125, 126 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989)
(family had knowledge of patient's mental illness and its manifestations).
44. In re Daniel C.H., 269 Cal. Rptr. 624, 633-34 (1990) (construing CAL.
EvID. CODE § 1016).
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tial;45 and where it was unsuccessfully alleged by plaintiffs that a
mentally ill adult's parents had undertaken a custodial relationship with their son when they allowed him to live with them after
his release from a psychiatric hospital."
In spite of the inconsistent treatment (including cases litigated
in several jurisdictions that either severely limit the Tarasoff duty
or flatly reject its holding), 7 the symbolic value'8 of Tarasoff remains compelling. 49 So compelling that no one has seriously questioned either Dr. James Beck's conclusion that the duty to protect
is now "a national standard of practice ' 50 or his admonition that
mental health professionals51 should practice "as if the Tarasoff
duty to protect is the law."
C.

Critical Commentary

Both Tarasoff and its supportive progeny were greeted initially with an "avalanche" of largely critical academic commentary.52 Commentators trained in the mental health professions initially criticized it for three main reasons: it was purportedly
45. People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127, 151 (1990).
46. Kaminski v. Fairfield, 578 A.2d 1048, 1052 (1990).
47. See, e.g., Shaw v. Glickman, 415 A.2d 625, 630-31 (1980) (sharply limiting
scope); Case v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 317, 318 (S.D. Ohio 1981), af'd, 709
F.2d 1500 (6th Cir. 1983) (rejecting Tarasoft).
48. On the power of symbolism in mental disability jurisprudence, see
Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence,40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 618-23 (1989-90).
49. 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 13.09, at 151.
50. James Beck, The Psychotherapist and the Violent Patient, in THE
TARASOFF DECISION,

supra note 5, at 9, 33; see also Menninger, The Impact of

Litigation and Court Decisions on Clinical Practice,53 BULL. MENNINGER CLINIC

203, 207 (1989) (same); cf. Givelber, supra note 5, at 474 (Tarasoff "potentially
the law everywhere").
51. Id. Cf. Michael D. Roth & Laurie J. Levin, Dilemma of Tarasoff: Must
Physicians Protect the Public or Their Patients? 11 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE

104, 110 (1983) (Tarasoff has been adopted "from coast to coast").
On the potential implications of Tarasoff for the attorney-client relationship,
see Marc L. Sands, The Attorney's Affirmative Duty to Warn Foreseeable Victims of a Client's Intended Violent Assault, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 355 (1986).
52. James George et al., The Therapist's Duty to Protect Third Parties:A
Guide for the Perplexed, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 637 (1983); Givelber, supra note 5, at
37; Charles B. McCarty, Patient Threats Against Third Parties:The Psychotherapist's Duty of Reasonable Care, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 119, 120

(1989).

36
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premised on the "false view" that valid professional standards enabling psychotherapists to accurately predict future violence did exist;53 it allegedly compromised confidentiality that was essential to
successful psychotherapy; 54 and, by raising the therapist's obligation to the public over her obligation to the individual patient, it
supposedly compromised "central professional ethical precepts." 6
Critical legal commentators looked primarily at confidentiality issues, predicting that the decision would reduce the success of therapy by decreasing patients' trust in their therapists, by discouraging patients from communicating sensitive information because of
fear of subsequent disclosure, and by causing patients to prematurely terminate therapy when they might learn of the potential
(or actual) breach of confidentiality. 6 Others expressed concern
that Tarasoff might lead to the overcommitment of patients as a
means of attempting to insure the potential victim's safety, 57 that
53. Givelber, supra note 5, at 37. There is a question as to whether clinical
standards for the prediction of dangerous behavior even exist. See Robert Wettstein, The Predictionof Violent Behavior and the Duty to protect Third Parties,
2 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 291, 311 (1984); Kaufman, Post-Tarasoff Developments and
the Mental Health Literature, 55 BULL. MENNINGER CLIN. 308, 311 (1991).
54. See, e.g., Joseph Dubey, Confidentiality as a Requirement for the Therapist: Technical Necessities for Absolute Privilege in Psychotherapy, 131 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1093 (1974); Elwin Griffith & Ezra Griffith, Duty to Third Parties,
Dangerousness, and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Problematic Concepts for
Psychiatristand Lawyer, 14 CAL. WEST. L.REv. 241, 247 (1978); Alan Stone, The
Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 358, 359 (1976). Stone, whose criticism of Tarasoff has been termed "the
most elegant," see David Wexler, Patients, Therapists, and Third Parties: The
Victimological Virtues of Tarasoff, 2 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 2 (1979), has
since receded to some extent from this position. See ALAN STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY. AND MORALITY 181 (1984) ("the duty to warn is not as unmitigated a disaster
for the enterprise of psychotherapy as it once seemed to critics like myself").
55. Givelber, supra note 5, at 37.
56. Toni Pryor Wise, Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165, 166 n.9
(1978); Leslie B. Small, Comment, Psychotherapists' Duty to Warn: Ten Years
After Tarasoff, 15 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 271, 272 n.7 (1985) (citing sources).
57. Theodore A. Olsen, Note, Imposing a Duty to Warn on Psychiatrists-A
Judicial Threat to the Psychiatric Profession, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 297
(1977); McCarty, supra note 53, at 133; Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 360 (Clark, J., dissenting); cf. McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 514 (1979) ("If psychiatrists now
say . . .that therapists are no more accurate than the average layman, serious
questions would arise as to the entire present basis for commitment procedures").
See generally infra text accompanying notes 76-79.
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the warnings themselves might cause the putative victim unnecessary emotional distress 8 or lead to preemptive retaliatory violence
on the part of the warned victim, 59 or that the requirement of giving warnings might drive therapists away from treating potentially
violent patients.6
More recent literature has considered the case from a variety
of other perspectives. First, influential professional associations
and commentators have urged state legislatures to adopt statutes
to limit potential liability for patients' future violent acts,6 1 arguing, in part, that such measures are a necessary step if any order is
to be made out of the "disharmony" caused by the "incoherent"
case law. 2 Second, other commentators have "unpacked 6' 3 the rea58. Griffith, supra note 54, at 250-51.
59. Personal communication, Dr. Robert L. Sadoff (July 12, 1991).
60. See Howard Gurevitz, Tarasoff: Protective Privilege Versus Public Peril,
134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 289 (1977).
61. For the most comprehensive overview, see Paul Appelbaum et al., Statutory Approaches to Limiting Psychiatrists'Liability for Their Patients' Violent
Acts, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 821 (1989) (Statutory Approaches); see also Michael
R. Geske, Note, Statutes Limiting Mental Health Professionals'Liability for the
Violent Acts of Their Patients, 64 IND. L.J. 391 (1989); McClarren, supra note 4,
at 286-93. On the potential implications of a Colorado statute (CoLo. REV. STAT. §
13-21-117 (1987)) partially limiting liability in cases involving a mental health
worker's failure to adequatelywarn or protect, see e.g., Jacqueline Johnson, Note,
A Proposal to Adopt a ProfessionalJudgment Standard of Care in Determining
the Duty of a Psychiatrist to Third Persons, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 237, 258-59
(1991) (statutory exceptions "effectively nullify" immunity grant); Recent Case,,
Tort Law-Scope of Psychiatrist's Liability For Acts of Released Inpatients-Colorado Supreme Court Holds Psychiatrist Liable Under Negligent
Theory For Violent Acts of Involuntary Committed Mental Patient-Perreirav.
State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989), 103 HARV. L. REV. 1192, 197-98 (1990) (immunity laws dilute psychiatrists' incentives to improve monitoring and diagnostic
techniques).
62. See Alan Felthous, The Ever Confusing Jurisprudence of the Psychotherapist'sDuty to Protect, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 575, 576, 590 (1989); see also
Joseph Bloom, The Tarasoff Decision: Dangerousnessand Mandated Outpatient
Treatment, 30 INT'L J. OFFENDER THER. &

COMPAR. CRIMINOL.

vii, viii (1986) (stat-

utes reflect "orderly progression in the attempt to more narrowly define the situations in which the Tarasoff requirement will apply, and provide clarity in the
law"). California is among the states that has adopted such a law. See CAL. CIv.
CODE § 43.92 (1991); see e.g., Juliet Virtue, Note, Tort Liability for California
Public Psychiatric Facilities: Time for a Change, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 459
(1989).
63. See Perlin, supra note 48, at 603-04; Michael L. Perlin, Power Imbalances in Therapeutic and Forensic Relationships, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 111, 128
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soning supporting Tarasoff-esque decisions to focus on the implicit
expectations of "clairvoyan[ce]" on the part of mental health professionals. 4 Third, commentators are now beginning to explore,
carefully and sensitively, the linkage between Tarasoff-type duties,
preventive detention and requirements that the therapist engage in
social control,6 5 a question that has troubling implications when
the therapist and patient are from different cultural backgrounds. 6 As I will explore later, the fear that Tarasoff concerns
(1991).
64. See Stephen Rachlin, Limiting the Dimensions of Tarasoff, J. Am. Ass'N
PSYCHIATRIC ADMINS. 1, 14 (Winter 1989-90). Cf. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
896-98 (1983) (no error to allow psychiatrists to predict dangerousness at sentencing phase of capital punishment case, notwithstanding argument by amicus American Psychiatric Association that such testimony was invalid due to "fundamentally low reliability"); see 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 17.13, at 531-32; see generally
Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or "Doctrinal
Abyss"? 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1987); Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the
Mentally Disabled CriminalDefendant, Psychiatric Testimony in Death Penalty
Cases, and the Power of Symbolism: Dulling the Ake in Barefoot's Achilles Heel,
3 N.Y. L. SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 91 (1985). On the extent to which patients seek (or
demand) certainty from their therapists, see Thomas Gutheil et al., Malpractice
Prevention Through the Sharing of Uncertainty, 311 N. ENGL. J. MED. 49, 50-51
(1984); on the significance of the subsequent "violation of expectations" in malpractice litigation, see Perlin, supra note 63, at 123 (discussing Marilyn L. May &
Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical
Grievances, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 105, 106 (1990)).
65. See Paul S. Appelbaum, The New Preventive Detention: Psychiatry's
Problematic Responsibility for the Control of Violence, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
779 (1988); Gregory B. Leong, The Expansion of PsychiatricParticipationin Social Control, 40 Hosp. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 240 (1989); compare Linn T.
Greenberg, The Psychiatrist'sDilemma, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 381 (1989) (recommending that psychiatrists use a low threshold of dangerousness as a basis for
commitment so as to avoid liability as a vehicle to spur legislative statutory reform); see infra text accompanying notes 107 & 173.
66. Griffith & Griffith, supra note 54, at 258 ("There is a tendency in such
situations for aggressive behavior to be misinterpreted as a sign of dangerousness"). On the impact of socioeconomic variables such as status, race and sex, and
such interpersonal variables as physical attractiveness and social likability on
mental health professionals' attitudes, see Richard Rogers, Ethical Dilemmas in
Forensic Evaluations, 5 BEHAV. Scl. & L. 149, 152 (1987), discussing Robert J.
Menzies et al., Dimensions of Dangerousness: Evaluating the Accuracy of Psychometric Predictors of Violence Among Forensic Patients, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV.

COURT

49 (1985), and

(1985).

MICHAEL SAKS

&

REID HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN
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distorted psychiatric hospital admission and release decisions and
led to the improper use of psychiatric facilities is critical to the
underlying inquiries.6 7
On the other hand, others have begun to react positively to
the Tarasoff duty, 68 reasoning it could result in more proper treatment and rehabilitation for patients, thus avoiding criminal and
civil proceedings that might otherwise have resulted. Others have
reported instances where warnings have furthered the therapeutic
alliance and contributed to a patient's progress in therapy.70 We
must assess these findings if we are to determine the ultimate therapeutic (or anti-therapeutic) impact of Tarasoff-type cases."1

III.

ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES

A.

Introduction

There is little left to add to this orthodox doctrinal dissection
of Tarasoff. The decision and its supportive progeny reflect the judicial attitudes that confidentiality is "trumpable, ' '1 2 that certain
kinds of dangerousness are predictable, and that warnings and/or
67. See Appelbaum, supra note 65, at 783; see also Paul S. Appelbaum, Hospitalization of the Dangerous Patient: Legal Pressures and Clinical Responses,
12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 323, 325 (1984) ("The natural response on
the part of clinicians has been to feel compelled to commit (or admit involuntarily) all dangerous patients, regardless of their suitability for hospitalization")
(emphasis in original)).
68. For earlier positive commentary, see Merton, supra note 20, at 276;
Shlomo Twerski, Note, Affirmative Duty After Tarasof, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1013, 1034 (1983); Brad S. Seligman, Note, Untangling Tarasoff: Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 180 (1977); George,
supra note 53, at 650. Cf. Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege
Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 60
N.C. L. REV. 893, 927 (1982) (need for absolute confidentiality in context of patient-physician relationship has been "overstated").
69. See, e.g., McCarty, supra note 52, at 121-22.
70. Mark J. Mills et al., Protecting Third Parties:A Decade After Tarasoff,
144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 68, 72 (1987), discussing findings reported in James S.
Beck, When a Patient Threatens Violence: An EmpiricalStudy of Clinical Practice After Tarasof[, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 189 (1982), and Lawson
R. Wulsin et al., Unexpected Clinical Features of the Tarasoff Decision: The
Therapeutic Alliance and the "Duty to Warn," 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 601 (1983).
71. See, e.g., Jeffrey Klotz, Limiting the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege:
The Therapeutic Potential, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 416 (1991).
72. The word "trump" in this context denotes the supremacy of one right or

duty over another right or duty. See generally Perlin, supra note 63, at 113 n.28.
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other prophylactic measures do work. While the arguments as to
predictivity and utility should be subject to empirical rebuttal,7"
courts have, as of yet, been singularly unimpressed. 4
Two inferences can be drawn. First, judges who see psychiatrists regularly predicting dangerousness in involuntary civil commitment cases and who see renegade psychiatrists predicting longterm future dangerousness in death penalty cases" (in cases where
such predictions typically implicate no liability exposure) 6 simply
73. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, Professional Liability and the Quality of
Mental Health Care, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 229, 230 (1988); Statutory
Approaches, supra note 61, at 821.
While the legal conclusion that confidentiality is not an absolute value, see,
e.g., United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1167 (11th Cir. 1983); In re
Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 641 (6th Cir. 1983), and is not similarly measurable, it is
possible to study the impact of less-than-total confidentiality in the therapistpatient relationship. See, e.g., Shuman & Weiner, supra note 68, at 928 (existence
of psychotherapist-patient privilege had a "marked bearing" on only a small percentage of individuals surveyed).
74. Empirical issues are discussed in Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 191, and in
Schuster, 424 N.W.2d at 168; see also infra text accompanying notes 181-83. Most
empirical studies suggest that the current data base does not yield enough information so that reasonably accurate predictions can be made as to the likelihood of
a specifically targeted person becoming an actual victim. See Gregory B. Leong et
al., The Tarasoff Dilemma in Criminal Court, 36 J. FORENS. Sci. 728, 734 (1991),
discussing Park Dietz, "Assessment of Violent Threats," (paper presented at
meeting of the Southern California chapter of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, Long Beach, CA, June 1990).
75. On involuntary civil commitment issues in this context, see generally
Perlin, supra note 63, at 117. On death penalty issues, see Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880 (1983); 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 17.13, at 529 n.270 (discussing testimony of Dr. James Grigson), and id. (citing sources criticizing Dr. Grigson's
testimony).
Interestingly, the majority of therapists responding to a major Tarasoff survey indicated (1) that they were "quite confident" in their abilities to predict
future violence, and (2) that they believed that almost all of their colleagues
would agree with these predictions. See Givelber et al., supra note 5, at 463-64.
Compare JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF
CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 92 (1981) (two out of three predictions of dangerousness by
psychiatrists and psychologists are inaccurate).
76. Improper civil commitment cases are rarely successful. See, e.g., Laurence
R. Tancredi, Psychiatric Malpractice, in 3 PSYCHIATRY, ch. 29, at 1, 7 (Jesse 0.
Cavenar ed. rev. ed. 1986); 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 12.25, at 70-71 (discussing
cases in which verdicts have been upheld or in which cases have been allowed to
proceed to trial based on improper civil commitment theories). Compare
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (failure to inquire into patient's competency to consent to voluntary hospitalization may trigger §1983 civil rights claim),
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do not buy the argument that predictions here are any murkier,7 7
especially where so many of the litigated cases (including Tarasoff
itself) include a specifically-identified victim.7 8 Recent literature
urging a "context-bound" or "interactionist" perspective on dangerousness has simply not been considered by legal fact-finders
weighing these cases.7 9 Second, while the literature raises arguments suggesting that warnings may be either useless or counterproductive, it does not appear that these arguments have been
made convincingly in the litigated cases.8 0
discussed carefully in Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary
Hospitalization:A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch,
14 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 169 (1991). On the relationship between the fear of
liability exposure in improper premature release cases and the fear of such exposure in improper civil commitment cases, see infra text accompanying note 182.
77. See Robert D. Miller et al., Emerging Problems for Staff Associated with
the Release of Potentially DangerousForensic Patients, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 309, 314 (1988):
The psychiatric profession, which had demonstrated its willingness to
predict future dangerousness when such predictions were required in
order to effect the involuntary commitment of patients who appeared
to need it clinically, or to facilitate the release of forensic patients who
were perceived not to require further hospitalization, is now surprised
to find that other courts are holding them accountable for that claim
of expertise in areas where they had not chosen to assert it.
See also Leonard S. Rubenstein, The Paradoxes of Professional Liability, 39
Hosp. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 815 (1988) (courts' perception that psychiatrists
have significant predictive expertise "encouraged, indeed fostered" by clinicians'
assertions).
78. Cf. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 354 (Mosk, J., concurring & dissenting)
(stressing significance of allegation in complaint that "defendant therapists did in
fact predict that Poddar would kill") (emphasis added). For a survey of cases
declining to apply Tarasoff where the victims were either not foreseeable nor
identifiable, see 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 13.14, at 165 nn.306-309.6.
79. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 53, at 312; Edward Mulvey & Charles
Lidz, Clinical Considerationsin the Prediction of Dangerousness in Mental Patients, 4 CLIN. PSYCHOLOGY REV. 379, 379 (1984); ROBERT G. MEYER ET AL., LAW
FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST 146 (1988).
80. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 65, at 783-85; see supra text accompanying notes 59-61, and sources cited. But compare supra text accompanying notes
69-71 (reporting positive outcomes of Tarasoff compliance). While we know that
there is little reliable data as to either the prophylactic value of Tarasoff warnings
or the case's actual impact on all aspects of clinical practice, see infra text accompanying note 185, it is still somewhat surprising that these arguments have not
been raised more frequently and more forcefully in cases already litigated.
Compare White v. United States, 780 F.2d 97, 105 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In
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Thus, while the characterization of Tarasoff as a "national
standard" may be somewhat overblown, it is clear that most courts
are comfortable with some sort of protective duty, and it is likely
that courts in "new" jurisdictions will generally agree with this
principle of law. The harder question is this: what are Tarasoif's
implications for cases arising in other settings? Specifically, how
should we read Tarasoff in light of (1) the responsibilities that
stem from forensic relationships, (2) cases involving persons with
AIDS, and (3) recently-developed bodies of constitutional law that
set out the rights of mentally disabled persons subject to
institutionalization?
B.

Other Settings

1. Forensic cases.-The forensic relationship, by its very nature, is an unbalanced one. 8 l The forensic mental health professional does not profess to "see a patient" for therapeutic reasons
(although forensic interactions may have a therapeutic component); rather, she intervenes on behalf of the litigation, administrative or economic needs of one of a series of third parties (e.g., an
attorney, a court, a prosecuting agency, an insurance company).
Without these external actors, the forensic relationship could not
exist.2 Thus, there is no expectation of absolute confidentiality at.
the forensic interview. 3
White, the court expressed no surprise that a hospital was unaware that a patient
would elope since the patient's therapist had told the subsequently-violent patient that he could not promise him full confidentiality in his disclosures. The
White court, however, affirmed a trial court decision declining to apply Tarasoff
as it found "reasonable" the therapist's assessment that a patient's single fantasy
of doing harm to his wife did not reflect a danger to her. Id. at 102; see generally
3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 13.16, at 167-68 (discussing White).
81. See generally Perlin, supra note 63, at 115-21. For helpful reviews of the
issues involved, see e.g., Rogers, supra note 66; Herbert C. Modlin, Forensic Psychiatry and Malpractice, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 153 (1990); Jerome
J. Shestack, Psychiatry and the Dilemma of Dual Loyalties, 60 A.B.A. J. 1521
(1974); Seymor L. Halleck, The Ethical Dilemmas of Forensic Psychiatry:A Utilitarian Approach, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 279 (1984). For an excellent comprehensive review, see Stephen R. Smith, Mental Health Expert Witnesses: Of Science and Crystal Balls, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 145 (1989).
82. See Barbara W. Weiner, Ethical Issues in Forensic Psychiatry: From an
Attorney's Perspective, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 253-54 (1984).
83. Paul Appelbaum, Confidentiality in the Forensic Evaluation, 7 INT'L J.
L. & PSYCHIATRY 285, 289-90 (1984).
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Should Tarasoff be extended to include claims made against
forensic mental health professionals? While this question has been
the topic of little legal scholarly consideration as of yet,84 academic
psychiatrists have begun to consider the contours of the Tarasoff!
forensic relationship.8 5 Also, forensic mental health professionals
now self-report concerns about the application of the Tarasoff
duty to situations where they evaluate the "threat" as a mere "expression of anger" with no imminent danger to a victim,
and see
86
ethical problems with the imposition of such a duty.

A recent California Supreme Court case has held that, once a
mental health professional retained by defense counsel to testify at
a criminal trial warns potential victims (based upon a threat made
by the defendant), expectations of further confidentiality are terminated, and the fact of the threats may be introduced at trial.87
This case raises the important and difficult question of the interplay between Tarasoff and cases such as Estelle v. Smith,88 on the

question of a forensic examiner's duty to inform a criminal defendant of potential disclosure of information shared during a forensic
interview. 89 It is reasonable to expect that these issues will surface
again in other jurisdictions,"0 leading to a more careful exploration
of the Tarasoff forensic setting intersection.
2. Persons with AIDS.-Scholars have begun to consider the
implication of Tarasoff warnings, in cases of persons with AIDS."
84. But see Karen H. Rothenberg, Note, The Application of the Tarasoff
Duty to Forensic Psychiatry, 66 VA. L. REV. 715, 725-26 (1980) (courts should be

willing to extend Tarasoff to cases based on failure of forensic psychiatrists to
warn potential victims of threats); compare Raymond B. Lacoursiere, M.D., Forensic Psychiatry:Less Typical Applications, 30 WASHBURN L.J. 29, 34-35 (1990)
(role of forensic expert in Tarasoff-type case). I consider this issue briefly in Per-

lin, supra note 63, at 115.
85. Appelbaum, supra note 83, at 288-90.
86. Robert Weinstock, Controversial Ethical Issues in Forensic Psychiatry:
A Survey, 33 J. FORENS. ScI. 176, 183 (1988).

87.
88.
89.
90.
figures,

People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127, 151 (1990).
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1983).
Clark is discussed carefully in this context in Leong, supra note 74.
On the relationship between Tarasoff and threats to national political
see Samuel Jan Brakel & Lauren Topelsohn, Threats to Secret Service

Protectees: Guidelines on the Mental Health Services Provider'sDuty to Report,

7 J. CONTEMP.

HEALTH L.

& POL. 47, 57-61 (1991).

91. See, e.g., Allen R. Dyer, AIDS, Ethics, and Psychiatry, 18 PSYCHIAT. ANN.
577 (1988); Stephen B. Bisbing, Psychiatric Patients and AIDS: Evolving Law
and Liability, 18 PSYCHIAT. ANN. 582 (1988); Howard Zonana et al., The AIDS
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One commentator has argued that "[n]o single concept typifies the
dilemma" facing health care providers more than the existence of a
Tarasoff duty, predicting that cases expanding on Tarasoif's core
concepts imply that AIDS cases will also be read in a similarly expansive manner.2 Recent research suggests that a patient's sex,
race, and sexual orientation may significantly control whether a
physician decides to reveal that such person carries the AIDS virus,93 making careful weighing of potential Tarasoff issues in this
context even more essential. The recent increase in AIDS-related
litigation should bring about closer scrutiny of the application of
4
Tarasoff in the context of cases involving persons with AIDS.
C.

95
Tarasoff and the ConstitutionalRights of Mental Patients

1. Introduction.-PaulAppelbaum's Tarasoff critique makes
Patienton the Psychiatric Unit: Ethical and Legal Issues, 18 PSYCHIAT. ANN. 587
(1988); Kenneth E. Labowitz, Beyond Tarasoff: AIDS and the Obligation to
Breach Confidentiality, 9 ST. L. U. PUB. L. REV. 495 (1990); Kimberly Waldron,
Note, AIDS: Establishing A Physician's Duty to Warn, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 645
(1990); William J. Curran et al., AIDS: Legal and Policy Implications of the Application of TraditionalDisease Control Measures, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE
27 (1987); Charles D. Weiss, AIDS: Balancing the Physician'sDuty to Warn and
Confidentiality Concerns, 38 EMORY L.J. 299 (1989). see generally David Rosmatin, Legal and Ethical Aspects of HIV Disease, in A PSYCHIATRIST'S GUIDE TO
AIDS AND HIV DISEASES 63-76 (Amer. Psychiatric Ass'n ed. 1990).
92. Labowitz, supra note 91, at 500, 503. See also Waldron, supra note 91
(concluding that the right of society to be free from the risk of AIDS outweighs a
patient's right to privacy); accord Judith L. Enjon, Comment, Doctor-Patient
Confidentiality Versus Duty to Warn in the Context of AIDS Patients and
Their Partners,47 MD. L. REV. 675 (1988). Compare, e.g., Curran et al., supra
note 91, at 29 (urging the adoption of statutes to protect physicians for liability)
to Weiss, supra note 92, at 308 (arguing against extending Tarasoff duty).
93. See Perlin, supra note 63, at 119 (discussing study reported on in Physician Biases Found to Affect Decision to Maintain Patient Confidentiality, PsyCHIATRIC NEWS,

Oct. 5, 1990, at 17).

94. Cf., e.g., Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center at Princeton, 592 A.2d
1251, 1279-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (discussing obligation of surgeon to
reveal his AIDS condition to patients). On the potential application of Tarasoff to
cases involving genetic counseling, see Geske, supra note 61, at 420-22.
95. Beyond the scope of this paper is the interrelationship (or lack of interrelationship) between Tarasoff cases (imposing a special tort duty) and the United
States Supreme Court's recent decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept.
of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1989), holding that the State had no such
"special duty" to protect under federal civil rights law or the Due Process clause
(mother of child beaten by child's father sued local social service officials and
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two important points relevant to the doctrine's interplay with the
bundle of constitutional rights of individuals institutionalized in
facilities for the mentally disabled. First, Tarasoff may increase
the use of preventive detention (as a means of avoiding liability on
the part of mental health professionals fearful of exposure to civil
suits), and second, it may serve to lessen the likelihood that individuals legitimately institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals will
receive adequate treatment.9 6 Appelbaum's argument is a compelling one and forces us to read Tarasoff in the context of a variety
of substantive constitutional mental disability law doctrines-involuntary civil commitment, outpatient commitment, the
right to the least restrictive alternative, the right to treatment, and
the right to refuse treatment-if we are to understand fully
Tarasoff's ultimate potential impact.
2. Involuntary civil commitment. 9 7-Early critics of Tarasoff
charged that it would lead to inappropriate civil commitment as a
means by which mental health professionals could eliminate their
potential liability.9 8 Dissenting in Tarasoff, Judge Clark had predicted that the duty to warn was likely to greatly increase the risk
of civil commitment-"the total deprivation of liberty ... of those
who should not be confined." 99 Appelbaum has warned of the "distorting influence" that liability concerns can have on admission deemployees, charging that they had failed to adequately protect the child by removing him from his father's custody).
I wish to thank Professor Peter Margulies for calling my attention to this
issue.
96. Appelbaum, supra note 65, at 783-86.
97. On the involuntary civil commitment process in general, see 1 PERLIN,
supra note 1, Chapters 2 & 3.
98. See Olsen, supra note 57, at 297.
99. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 360 (Clark, J., dissenting). But see McCarty, supra
note 53, at 122-23 (benefits of Tarasoff outweigh costs, including patient's potential lost liberty). Cf. Robert A. Miller, OutpatientCivil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: An Overview and an Update, 6 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 99, 111 (1988) ("There
have been, to my knowledge, no published cases to date involving liability of therapists for the actions of civilly committed outpatients"). But see Cain v. Rijken,
700 P.2d 1061 (Cr. Ct. App. 1985) (community day treatment program providing
aftercare services to insanity acquittee had assumed responsibility to exercise reasonable care to control the "dangerous propensities of the patient"); compare
Halverson v. Pike's Peak Fain. Counseling, 795 P.2d 1352 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990)
(statutory immunity would apply equally in duty to warn cases involving inpatients and outpatients) (third-party patient in Halverson was inpatient).
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cisions. 10 0 Other commentators have begun to consider the many
underlying policy questions encrusted in the civil commitment decision in the context of Tarasoff: e.g., the appropriate balancing
that must be struck between clinical choice and legal duty; the risk
factors associated with inappropriate commitment; and the linkage
between commitment, deprivation of liberty, and the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine. 01
Yet, Tarasofrs full range of potential implications for involuntary civil commitment policy have not been seriously addressed. °2
Given what we now know about the way that a single vivid or "outrageous" case can dramatically increase commitment rates,103 we
must reevaluate Tarasof's implicit endorsement of commitment as
100. Appelbaum, supra note 65, at 783. See also Mills, supra note 70, at 72:
"We suggest that when possible, the clinician shift to the courts the burden of the
decision making regarding release from the hospital and long-term treatment of
potentially violent patients." This issue is confounded further by research that
suggests that clinicians' predictions of future violence become more conservative
"[a]s the consequences of incorrectly predicting nonviolence become more severe." Stanley L. Brodsky, Fear of Litigation in Mental Health Professionals, 15
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 492, 496 (1988) (discussing MONAHAN, supra note 75).
101. See Bednar, supra note 39, at 273-78; Bernard M. Dickens, Legal Issues
in Medical Management of Violent and Threatening Patients, 31 CANAD. J. PSYCHIATRY 772, 773-76 (1986). In most jurisdictions, a person can not be involuntarily committed unless there is clear and convincing evidence that she is mentally
ill, and, as a result of that mental illness, dangerous to herself or others. See, e.g.,
1 PERLIN, supra note 1, §§ 2.06-.16; §§ 3.40-.42; State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289 (N.J.
1975); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (subsequent citations omitted); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). On the question of the
applicability of the least restrictive alternative in the commitment context, see
infra text accompanying note 108.
102. On the other hand, we know that many clinicians misunderstand the
relationship between Tarasoff and involuntary civil commitment. See Givelber,
supra note 5, at 467 (over 10% of all therapists surveyed believed Tarasoff required them to seek emergency involuntary commitment to comply with case's
mandate), and id. at 477-78 (about one-third of all therapists surveyed were more
willing to initiate involuntary hospitalization after Tarasoff):
103. See Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization,and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization,28 Hous. L. REv. 63, 128-29 (1991), discussing, inter alia, R. Michael Bagby & Leslie Atkinson, The Effects of Legislative
Reform on Civil Commitment Admission Rates: A Critical Analysis, 6 BEHAV. ScI.
& L. 45, 46 (1988); and William H. Fischer et al., How Flexible Are Our Civil
Commitment Statutes? 39 Hosp. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 711, 712 (1988). On the
role of this sort of heuristic fallacy in decisionmaking in this area, see infra note
146.
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an alternate means of remediating liability potential." °4 At least
one commentator has already recommended that psychiatrists
lower their dangerousness threshold so as to avoid liability in
Tarasoff-type cases;10 5 if this position becomes a popular one, the
dilemma for mental health professionals will become even
starker.106

3. Least restrictive alternative.-Over the past two decades,
a substantial body of statutory and constitutional law has developed holding that involuntarily committed mental patients have
either a right to the "least restrictive alternative" or to a "reasonably nonrestrictive" setting for treatment. 0 7 I have previously noted
the inherent conflict between this body of case law and tort cases
that seek to impose liability on institutional psychiatrists for developing "open door" policies' 08 that may carry risks to both the
patient, as well as to the general public.' 0 9 While courts have generally rejected liability claims in "open door" cases, 1 the policy is
still characterized as a "calculated risk.""'
104. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340 ("discharge of this duty may require the
therapist ....
to warn the intended victim . . ., to notify the police, or to take
whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances") (emphasis added). But compare supra note 102 (extent to which therapists believe
Tarasoff requires initiation of commitment proceedings).
105. See Greenberg, supra note 65.
106. See Johnson, Note, supra note 61, at 254-57 (setting out alternatives).
Several of the statutory reforms enacted in the wake of Tarasoff explicitly permit
efforts at involuntary hospitalization as a means of effectuating the Tarasoff duty.
See Statutory Approaches, supra note 61, at 825-26.
107. See 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, §§ 3.46-51 (discussing least restrictive alternative" case law and statutes); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982)
(setting out "reasonably non-restrictive" standard).
108. The phrase is discussed in Johnson v. United States, 409 F. Supp. 1283,
1293 (M.D. Fla. 1976); see also Joel Klein & Stephen I Glover, PsychiatricMal-

practice, 6

INT'L

J. L. & PsYCHIATRY 131, 145-46 (1983); Note, Liability of Mental

Hospitals for Acts of Their Patients Under the Open Door Policy, 57 VA. L. REV.
156 (1971).
109. See 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 12.18, at 54.
110. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 108; Predoti v. Bergen Pines County
Hosp., 463 A.2d 400 (App. Div. 1983); see also Moon v. United States, 512 F.
Supp. 140 (D. Nev. 1981).
111. M.W. v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n of St. Louis, 637 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982); see also Eanes v. United States, 407 F.2d 823, 824 (4th Cir. 1969)
(while court refuses to "condemn, per se, the open door policy," it suggests that
"great care and caution" be undertaken so as to assure that the risks involved not
be "underestimated or miscalculated").
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At least one post-Tarasoff case that imposes a duty to protect
has noted that, while state statutes did mandate less restrictive alternatives in commitment and release decision-making, those statutory schemes did not "contemplate that the decision to release an
involuntarily committed patient [might] be made without regard
to the safety of others."' 2 As state legislators continue to become
more receptive to pleas to broaden civil commitment criteria," 3
and as they consider whether courts should be involved in release
decision-making in the cases of all patients involuntarily committed pursuant to a dangerousness finding is placed on the debate
agenda," 4 the relationship between Tarasoff and restrictiveness of
institutional conditions will likely attract more judicial, legislative
and scholarly scrutiny." 5
4. Right to treatment.-If hospitals are being used to detain
potentially dangerous individuals because of fear of liability," 6 we
must consider the implications of the right to treatment doctrine
for this population. Institutionalized patients are constitutionally
and statutorily entitled to adequate treatment, and, in many jurisdictions, such treatment must be designed so as to give each patient "a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her
mental condition."" 7 How can this right to meaningful treatment
112. Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 1218 (Colo. 1989), discussed extensively
in Johnson, Note, supra note 61.
113. See Perlin, supra note 103, at 128-29.
114. See id. at 127 n.380 (panel discussion on this topic-"Discharging 'Dangerous' Patients: Who Decides?-presented at the annual conference of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, October 1990, San Diego, CA).
115. Recent criticisms of deinstitutionalization policy, see generally Perlin,
supra note 103, will also likely spur this debate. On the ethical issues raised for
mental health professionals by deinstitutionalization decisionmaking, see, e.g., J.
Richard Ciccone & Colleen D. Clements, The Ethical Practice of Forensic Psychiatry: A View From the Trenches, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 263, 268-69

(1984).
116. See Appelbaum, supra note 65, at 783.
117. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (subsequent
citations omitted); see generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 1, §§ 4.07-.19. For state
statutes following Wyatt and its progeny, see id. §§ 11.03-.07; Michael L. Perlin,
State Constitutions and Statutes As Sources of Rights for the Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier? 20 Lov. L.A L. REV. 1249, 1296-1317 (1987). In

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982), the Supreme Court found that
institutionalized mentally retarded individuals had a constitutional right to "minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue
restraint."
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be effectuated11 8 if patients, unlikely to benefit from hospitalization, are admitted due to Tarasoff fears?11 9
The United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari on a case whose disposition may have ominous implications for
the answer to this question. In State v. Foucha, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that it was appropriate to continue a patient's
commitment where he was found to be no longer mentally ill, but
was still dangerous to others. 2 ' Although Foucha involves an insanity acquittee, if the Supreme Court's ultimate decision suggests
that mental illness is not a sine qua non for institutionalization in
a mental hospital, the right to treatment and Tarasoff may be
placed on a new collision course. 2 '
5. Treatment in community settings.-Because of perceptions that deinstitutionalization has been responsible for the inappropriate release of patients unable to care for themselves, commentators have urged the adoption of outpatient commitment
118. See also Michael A. Norko et al., ProsecutingAssaultive PsychiatricInpatients, 42 Hosp. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 193 (1991) (listing factors, including
Tarasoff, that result in an increase in violent patients being treated at mental
health centers, which increases the danger to other patients and staff members).
119. Appelbaum, supra note 65, at 783.
120. State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138, 1141 (La. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S.
Ct. 1412 (1991); see 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 15.25A, at 105-07 (1991 pocket
part).

121. That is, if the Supreme Court rules that the Louisiana statute under
which Foucha's institutionalization continues is constitutional, courts will quickly
be confronted with new questions as to the rights of such patients-dangerous
but not as a result of mental illness-to refuse treatment. Although the direct
precedential weight of such a decision in Foucha would initially necessarily be
limited to other cases involving insanity acquittees, it is certainly within the
realm of possibility that such a hypothetical decision could be looked at as authority to buttress commitment of individuals who are seen as potentially dangerous under Tarasoff. Courts would then have to consider the scope of the right to
refuse treatment for such a population. Compare Appelbaum, supra note 65, at
781:
When the potential for violence is long-term and dissociated from any
acute disorder that might exist, the current system provides powerful
incentives for psychiatrists to prolong hospitalization beyond the term
of useful treatment. Persons thought to be dangerous are deprived of
freedom for a time but without therapeutic gain. Meanwhile, the longterm threat inevitably remains whenever the patient is discharged.
On the relationship between Tarasoff and treatability in general, see LaBella
Kyle, Note, From Tarasoff to Bradley, Courts Struggle to Apply the Duty to
Control Mental Patients, 14 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 165, 169-70 (1984).
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(OPC) as a potential solution.1 22 Supporters of OPC statutes argue
-that such laws would insure that such individuals would have access to "protective liberty" through broad-based treatment mechanisms in community settings. 2 3 Opponents have responded that
OPC will subvert the dangerousness standard, lead to quality control problems, and defeat the right to refuse treatment.12 4 While
early empirical studies have been mixed,' 25 most suggest that the
ultimate success of OPC will depend on the dedication of community mental health center staff members "to making [it] work";
where centers pay only "lip service" to OPC, the law becomes
undermined.' 2 6
Three separate Tarasoff concerns are raised here. First, we
must consider the effect that Tarasoff may have on a patient's unwillingness to participate in such treatment, 2 ' as well as the implications for subsequent institutional treatment if a patient's outpatient status is terminated as a result of such refusal. 2 ' Second, as
there is already some strong evidence that community centers
"have historically turned their back on precisely the population
122. See Perlin, supra note 103, at 119-26.
123. See Virginia A. Hiday & Teresa L. Scheid-Cook, The North Carolina
Experience With Outpatient Commitment: A Critical Appraisal, 10 INT'L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 215 (1987); Edward P. Mulvey et al., The Promise and Peril of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 571, 577-79 (1987).
124. Mulvey et al., supra note 123, at 575-77. On the role of forced medication in OPC schemes, see Steven I. Schwartz & Cathy E. Costanzo, Compelling
Treatment in the Community: Distorted Doctrines and Violated Values, 20 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1329, 1380-85 (1987). I discuss this extensively in Michael L. Perlin,
Reading the Supreme Court's Tea Leaves: PredictingJudicial Behavior in Civil
and CriminalRight to Refuse Treatment Cases, 12 AM. J. FORENS. PSYCHIATRY 37,
50-51 (1991).
125. See Perlin, supra note 103, at 122 n.343 (comparing studies).
126. Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 123, at 229-31.
127. See Johnson, Note, supra note 61, at 254-55.
128. Perlin, supra note 124, manuscript at 50-51. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. §
51.20(13)(dm) (OPC permissible if court finds patient's dangerousness "is likely
to be controlled with appropriate medication administered on an outpatient basis"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-201(b)(2) (allowing OPC where patient is subject to
the "obligation to participate in any medically appropriate outpatient treatment,
including ... medication"); In re Anderson, 140 Cal. Rptr. 546, 550 (1977) (medication an appropriate condition of outpatient treatment). Compare In re Richardson, 481 A.2d 473, 479 n.5 (D.C. 1984) ("Not every instance of the outpatient's
failure to take prescribed medication or attend therapy sessions justifies the conclusion that he is not cooperating with the treatment program").
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that OPC was designed to serve,"12' 9 it should not surprise us if
potential liability serves to increase community clinicians' resistance to becoming involved with patients subject to OPC statutes.1 30 Third, if individuals in out-patient settings are deemed capable of generating Tarasoff liability,13 1 such characterizations
"would certainly temper the interest to treat them in the
1' 32
community.'
6. Right to refuse treatment.-No aspect of institutionalization is more controversial than the right of involuntarily committed patients to refuse the administration of antipsychotic medications.1 33 In honoring a limited or qualified right to refuse,'3 4 courts
have clearly admonished psychiatric facilities not to use medications as a substitute for treatment or as a means of social con3
trol.'1
While the Supreme Court, in Washington v. Harper,'36 has
subsequently sharply limited the right of convicted prisoners to refuse medication it nevertheless cautioned against the arbitrary use
of drugs,' 7 noting that involuntary medication "represents a substantial interference with [a] person's liberty."' 38 Also, there is no
indication that Harper will cause significant cutbacks in the right
39
to refuse doctrine as it applies to other populations.'
If Tarasoff leads to the hospitalization of disruptive individu129. Perlin, supra note 103, at 122; see also Schwartz & Costanzo, supra note
124, at 1386-89.
130. Miller, supra note 99, at 112.
131. See supra note 100 (discussing Cain v. Rijken, 700 P.2d 1.061 (1985)).
132. Bloom, supra note 62, at ix; see also id. "Should outpatient civil commitment fall victim to Tarasoff-type fears, it would be a major treatment
setback."
133. See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 1, Chapter 5; Perlin, supra note 124,
at 40 ("[Tlhis is probably the most important subject matter under consideration
in the area of the legal regulation of mental health practice.").
134. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rivers v. Katz, 495
N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986); Perlin supra note 124, at 40-46; Perlin, supra note 117, at
1283-92.
135. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 (D.N.J. 1979), modified 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated & remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on
remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
136. 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
137. 110 S. Ct. at 1040.
138. Id. at 1041.
139. Perlin, supra note 124, at 47-48, discussing, inter alia, Williams v. Walczak, 573 A.2d 809 (Md. 1990) (partially relying on Harper in upholding an insanity acquittee's right to refuse).
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als who are unlikely to benefit from psychiatric treatment, serious
constitutional questions about the right of such individuals to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment are raised. In addition, important ethical considerations-centering on the motivation of the institutional treaters "°'-are implicated as well.

IV.

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE

A.

'90s?

Introduction

If Tarasoff is to be truly understood, it is necessary to consider these issues in light of yet another set of concerns. First, we
need to consider recent developments from the perspective of cognitive psychology, and look at the way heuristic reasoning shapes
both Tarasoff decision-making, as well as mental health professionals' responses to Tarasoff-type cases. Then, we must turn to
"therapeutic jurisprudence" as a means of identifying and examining the extent of the relationship between "legal arrangements and
therapeutic outcomes." ' Finally, I will draw on these inquiries,
and try to offer some predictions for future judicial and legislative
behavior in this area in an effort to determine the ultimate impact
of Tarasoff on our malpractice jurisprudence.
B.

Cognitive Psychology

Interest has recently been kindled in the use of cognitive psychology in the legal process. Focusing primarily on concepts that
describe and explain heuristic reasoning and thinking, cognitive
psychology serves as a means of explaining judicial, legislative and
lay decisionmaking, and as a vehicle by which to interpret developments in mental disability law.142
140. See also Joseph Brown & J. Thomas Rayne, Some Ethical Considerations in Defense of Psychiatry: A Case Study, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 534

(1989); see generally Appelbaum, supra note 65. Compare Troyen A. Brennan,
Ensuring Adequate Health Care for the Sick: The Challenge of the Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome as an Occupational Disease, 1988 DUKE L.J. 29, 4247 (discussing ethical issues facing health care workers in treating patients with
AIDS).
141. David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 32 (1992).

142. 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 1.05A n.156.1, at 5 (1991 pocket part). See
generally Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processingand
Adjudication: Trial By Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'v REV. 123 (1980-81).
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Simply put, "heuristics" refers to the implicit devices that individuals use to simplify complex information-processing tasks,
leading to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions, and
causing decision-makers to "ignore or misuse items of rationally
useful information. 1 1 4 3 The vivid, "outrageous" case overwhelms
reams of abstract data upon which rational choices should be
made; 44 mental health professionals are as susceptible to these devices as are judges, jurors, legislators or other lay persons. 4 5
In a series of papers, I have considered the power of heuristics
in establishing mental health law policy in such areas as the insanity defense, 4 6 the relationship between deinstitutionalization
and homelessness, 4 7 and the right to refuse treatment.'4 8 Such
heuristic devices as the vividness effect, availability, typification,
and attribution theory'4 9 can be powerful animators of legislative
143. Perlin, supra note 124, at 53; Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent
to Decide Competency Questions? Stripping the Facade from United States v.
Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 957, 966 n.46 (1990), quoting, in part, John S. Carroll
& John W. Payne, The Psychology of the Parole Decision Process: A Joint Application of Attribution Theory and Information-ProcessingPsychology, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 13, 21 (John S. Carroll & John W. Payne eds. 1976).
144. David L. Rosenhan, Psychological Realities and Judicial Policy, 19
STAN. LAW. 10 (1984). Thus, one instance in which an ex-patient (or an individual
denied admission to a mental hospital) commits a crime of violence may have the
effect of dramatically increasing civil commitment rates in a jurisdiction in spite
of whether or not the commitment criteria are amended in response to the violent
incident. See, e.g., Bagby & Atkinson, supra note 103, at 46; Fischer, supra note
103, at 712. On the way that such a vivid case affects legislative policy in criminal
law, see People v. Seefeld, 290 N.W.2d 123, 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (discussing
the adoption of the guilty but mentally ill verdict).
145. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER D. WEBSTER ET AL., CLINICAL ASSESSMENTS
BEFORE TRIAL 121 (1982); Margaret A. Jackson, The Clinical Assessment and
Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Scientific Analysis, 16 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 114 (1989); Margaret W. Jackson, Psychiatric Decision-Making for the
Courts: Judges, Psychiatrists,Lay People? 9 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 507 (1986).
146. Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB.L. REV. 3 (1990).
147. Perlin, supra note 103.
148. Perlin, supra note 126; Perlin, supra note 146.
149. "Availability" refers to the way that we tend to judge the probability or
frequency of an event based upon the ease with which we recall occurrences of the
event; "typification" involves the characterization of a current experience as one
which is familiar to an individual through reference to past stereotypic behaviors;
under "attribution theory," once we adopt a stereotype, we interpret a wide variety of additional information so as to reinforce that stereotype. See generally Per-
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amendment, judicial decisionmaking, jury deliberation, and professional response in Tarasoff-type cases.
Some of the empirical research and commentary to which I
have already referred reflects this phenomenon. Thus, more than
three-quarters of the clinicians surveyed reported that the issuance
of warnings was the sole acceptable means of protecting potential
victims. 150 Also, commentators have significantly overstated the
precedential effect of Tarasoff in all federal and state 'jurisdictions. 151 Beyond this, we can be fairly confident in predicting that
the distortions inherent in the heuristic reasoning style will have
an important impact on an area of mental disability jurisprudence
as volatile, demanding and contentious as the duty to warn. If we
ignore the power of heuristics here, we proceed at our own peril.
C.

Therapeutic Jurisprudence

We must also turn our attention to the construct of "therapeutic jurisprudence" as a model by which to assess the ultimate impact of case law and legislation that affects mentally disabled individuals. "Therapeutic jurisprudence" studies the role of the law as
a therapeutic agent. 15 This perspective recognizes that substantive
rules, legal procedures, and lawyers' roles may have either therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences, and questions whether
such rules, procedures, and roles can or should be reshaped so as to
lin, supra note 146, at 13-18, 29-30, citing, inter alia, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds., 1982); SHARON C.
BREHM & JACK

W.

BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE:

A

THEORY OF FREEDOM AND

CONTROL (1981); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980) (all discussing heuristics in gen-

eral); Anthony N. Doob & Julian V. Roberts, Social Psychology, Social Attitudes,
and Attitudes Toward Sentencing, 16 CANAD. J. BEHAV. SCI. 269 (1984) (vividness
effect); Shari S. Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of JudicialLeniency in
Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 73 (1989) (vividness effect); David E. Van Zandt,
Commonsense Reasoning, Social Change and the Law, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 894
(1987) (typification); Harold H. Kelley, The Process of Causal Attribution, 28 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 107 (1973) (attribution); Dan Russell, The Causal Dimension
Scale: A Measure of How Individuals Perceive Causes, 42 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 1137 (1982) (attribution); Saks & Kidd, supra note 142, at 137

(availability).
150. See Givelber, supra note 8, at 465.
151. See, e.g., Roth & Levin, supra note 51.
152. See DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); Wexler, supra note 141.

THE LAW

AS A
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enhance their therapeutic potential, while not subordinating due
process principles.' 5 3
Thus, authors have recently considered the therapeutic jurisprudential issues inherent in such mental disability law issues as
the insanity acquittee conditional release hearing, 5" juror decisionmaking in malpractice and negligent release litigation, ' 55 competency to consent to treatment,' 5' standards of psychotherapeutic
tort liability,' 5 7 the impact of scientific discovery on substantive
criminal law doctrine,' 58 and the relationship between voluntary
and involuntary commitment.'5 9
Tarasoff, therefore, should be the source of a variety of therapeutic jurisprudential inquiries. First, what impact will the need to
comply with Tarasoff have on clinical practice? Second, will
courts' construction of empirical evidence that is developed about
such impact take into consideration therapeutic jurisprudential
values? Third, what impact will Tarasoff litigation have on clinical
practice?
Much of the first wave of Tarasoff commentary spoke, sub
153. David B. Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principles and the Insanity
Acquittee Conditional Release Process, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 18, 19 n.5 (1991); see
generally Wexler, supra note 141.
154. Wexler, supra note 153.
155. David B. Wexler & Robert Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror
Hindsight Bias in Mental Health MalpracticeLitigation: Some PreliminaryObservations, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 485 (1989); Norman G. Poythress, Jr., Negligent
Release Litigation:A Proposal for ProceduralReform, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 595
(1989); Norman G. Poythress, Jr., Avoiding Negligent Release: Contemporary
Clinical and Risk Management Strategies, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 994 (1990).
156. Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15 (1991).
157. Robert F. Schopp & David B. Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot
With Due Care: Psychotherapistsand Crystallized Standards of Tort Liability,
17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 163 (1989); compare Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking the
Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks Between Patients and Providers, 49
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (Spring 1986).
158. David B. Wexler, Inducing Therapeutic Compliance Through the Criminal Law, 14 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 43 (1990).
159. See Winick, supra note 76. There has also been a heightened call for
further investigations into such other areas as the due process involuntary civil
commitment hearing, the juvenile commitment process, the implications of the
extension of right to refuse treatment doctrine to "new populations," power imbalances in forensic relationships, and the ways in which counsel are appointed to
represent the mentally disabled. See 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 1.05A, nn.156.12156.17, at 6 (1991 pocket part) (citing sources).
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silentio, to the first of these concerns. 160 Thus, after Alan Stone
initially assailed Tarasoff, warning that it would "destroy the patient's expectation of confidentiality,"'' the first wave of empirical
studies seemed to belie this prediction. 6 2 While warnings not discussed with patients were interpreted to be therapeutically harmful, warnings that were discussed were interpreted to have positive
therapeutic effects.' 6 3 Other empirical inquiries have focused on
the ways that clinician awareness of Tarasoff has altered the therapeutic relationship, suggesting that the increased awareness of and
concern about possible violence may lead to "heightened anxiety..
. in any clinical situation in which the potential violence of a patient becomes an issue, or in which the prospect of a duty to warn
arises."' 4"
160. Some also spoke to it openly. See Wexler, supra note 54, at 4 ("Tarasoff
...has the clear-cut potential of prompting and prodding practicing therapists to
terminate their continued clinging to an outmoded 'individual pathology' model
of violence, and to accept the paradigm of 'interactional' or 'couple' violence already endorsed by the professional literature."). Wexler's insights are discussed in
3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 13.21, at 182-84.
161. Stone, supra note 54.

162. See Mills et al., supra note 70, at 70, discussing findings reported in del
Rio, Ellsberg Psychoanalytic Situation, 5 INT'L J. PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 349 (1976); Donald Schmid et al., Confidentiality in Psychiatry: A Study of
the Patient's View, 34 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 353 (1983). On Stone's
recession from his initial position, see STONE, supra note 55.
163. Richard J. Carlson et al., The Duty to Warn/Protect:Issues in Clinical
Practice, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 179, 181-84 (1987), discussing, in
part, Beck, supra note 10; Joseph C. Finney, Breaking Confidences: An Application of the Tarasoff Rule, 3 Am. J. FORENS. PSYCHIATRY 135 (1982-83). See also
Judith Treadway, Tarasoff in the Therapeutic Setting, 41 Hosp. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 88, 89 (1990) (Fulfilling Tarasoff's duty "encourages patients to make
choices, to be involved in decisionmaking, and to accept that they, not the therapist, have the ultimate responsibility for impulse control."). If, as has been reported, patients most knowledgeable about the work of health professionals are
the least likely to sue, see May & Stengel, supra note 64, at 117, it would seem

worth asking whether the involvement of the patient in this sort of decisionmaking might have some subsequent reductive effect on litigation.
For a recent inquiry into the impact of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
from a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective, see Klotz, supra note 71 (arguing
that the absence of an absolute privilege might better prevent harmful behavior).
164. Wise, supra note 56, at 186-88. In response to such concerns, thoughtful
commentators have crafted a series of guidelines to therapists to help them deal
with the Tarasoff "paradox." See Loren H. Roth & Alan Meisel, Dangerousness,
Confidentiality,and the Duty to Warn, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 508, 509-11 (1977);
see also Paul S. Appelbaum, Tarasoff and the Clinician: Problems in Fulfilling
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These findings lead to other inquiries. First, to what extent
does therapist misinformation about the scope of Tarasoff negatively affect therapist-patient relationships? Surveys suggest that
therapists have overstated both the Tarasoff prescription (as to
ways of effectuating the duty) as well as its national precedential
applicability. Furthermore, they frequently misstate its holding,' 6 5
construe it to require accurate predictions,16 6 and, others believe
the duty to be triggered by utterance of any threat. 6' 7 Also, it has
been argued that professionals have been misled by associational
newsletters that have distorted or misstated the holdings of
Tarasoff's progeny, and that these misunderstandings serve to further alienate law and psychotherapy. 68
These inquiries raise yet another concern: have therapists responded to Tarasoff by adopting a passive-aggressive style of behavior?' 6 9 Commentators have speculated that the motivations of
some of the clinicians who have responded to Tarasoif by overpredicting violence and over-issuing warnings1 70 may be simply
the Duty to Protect, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 425, 426-27 (1985). I discuss these
guidelines in 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 13.20, at 179-81, and Perlin, supra note 63,
at 127, and consider alternative solutions in 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 13.20 at
181-82 n.422, and id., § 13.20, at 48 n.422 (1991 pocket part).
165. See supra notes 76 & 104; Givelber, supra note 8, at 466. See also Bette
Runck, Survey Shows Therapists Misunderstand Tarasoff Rule, 35 Hosp. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 429 (1984).
166. See Dickens, supra note 101, at 773. Compare Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 34445 (exercise of reasonable care required).
167. Appelbaum, supra note 164, at 427.
168. Joseph C. George, Hedlund Paranoia,41 J. CLIN. PSYCHOLOGY 291, 29394 (1985).
169. See Perlin, supra note 146, at 984-85, 989 (discussing passive-aggressive
behavior in the context of right to refuse medication litigation). Compare, e.g.,
Greenberg, supra note 65 (recommending the adoption of a lower standard of
dangerousness in commitment decisionmaking by clinicians).
170. See Runck, supra note 167, at 430. Compare Roth & Meisel, supra note
164, at 509-11 (in Tarasoff situations, therapists should avoid being "stampeded"
into giving unnecessary warnings, should provide information as to limits of confidentiality prior to entering into the therapeutic relationship, should employ "social and environmental manipulations"-such as bringing third parties into the
therapeutic setting-prior to compromising confidentiality; should obtain, wherever possible, per mission of patients prior to discussing confidential communications with others; and should assess any such intervention in light of its potential
impact on therapy and the likelihood that it will be successful in preventing future violence).
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their concern to escape legal liability.' 71 Others have reported that
some clinicians have become reluctant to probe into areas of their
patients' lives dealing with violence, 172 while others have altered
their record-keeping (either by obscuring information that might
suggest violence or by "padding" a record with information so as to
support a decision not to warn). 173 Still others have argued that
clinicians in hospitals should decline to assume final responsibility
for releasing violent patients, and should require court interventions in all such cases. 74 Thus, Professors Schopp and Wexler have
concluded:
If the clinician is sufficiently concerned about tort liability to
conduct the therapeutic relationship with a wary eye toward
protecting his own interests regarding liability, that attitude
may be sufficient to dilute the therapist's apparent trustworthiness and concern for the patient's 1 welfare and thus to undermine the therapeutic relationship. 71
Further, this must be all weighed in light of yet another body
of data that has found that doctors sued for malpractice reported
significantly more emotional and psychological distress than nonsued physicians, that significantly more of the sued group were
likely to stop seeing certain kinds of patients, to discourage their
children from entering medicine, and to think about early
retirement. 7 '
171. Daniel J. Sonkin, Clairvoyance vs. Common Sense: Therapist's Duty to
Warn and Protect, 1 VICTIMS & VIOLENCE 7, 19 (1986).

172. Compare Perlin, supra note 146, at 35-36 (discussing reluctance of
judges and insanity defense policymakers to "'go deeper' when we unconsciously
fear what we may learn at a deeper level of exploration").
173. Wise, supra note 56, at 188-89.
174. Mills et al., supra note 70, at 72; see also supra note 117.
175. Schopp & Wexler, supra note 157, at 184.
176. Sara C. Charles et al., Sued and Nonsued Physicians' Self-Reported
Reactions to Malpractice Litigation, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 437 (1985); cf. Stephen M. Rosoff, Physicians as Criminal Defendants: Specialty, Sanctions, and
Status Liability, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 235 (1989) (questioning whether

"status liability"-the positive relationship found between punishment and status
when a high occupational status defendant commits a serious criminal offense-operates in the context of medical malpractice cases as well): see also Ellen G. McDaniel, Book Review of ROBERT SIMON, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW (1987), 39 Hosp. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 999 (1988) ("My problem, on completion of this text, was the gripping realization of how endless were the possibilities of being a defendant, regardless of the outcome. I had a momentary impulse
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Others have concluded that it is not simply the reality, but the
possibility of malpractice litigation that is the source of "marked
anxiety" in many mental health professionals 177 and what Robert
Simon has called "iatrogenic liability neurosis" can capture a therapist's professional judgment. 17 If clinicians believe-accurately or
inaccurately-that adopting the sort of behavior just described will
minimize their malpractice exposure, it is not unreasonable for us
to conclude that more will follow that approach. This conclusion
must be read in the context of evidence suggesting that many clinicians believe that if they were to release a patient who subsequently commits a violent act, their liability exposure (both as to
likelihood of being sued and to the extent of potential monetary
damages) would be much greater than in a case in which they were
to improperly civilly commit an individual who does not meet statutory commitment criteria.' 7 9
Next, we need turn our attention to the ways that courts construe empirical evidence in Tarasoff cases. The few courts that
have considered the issue have not responded in any uniform or
coherent way. Two cases, including Tarasoff, have simply concluded that there was little empirical evidence to support the prediction that imposing a duty would lead to overcommitment.' 8 0
One of the courts that has distinguished Tarasoff relied on Stone's
prediction that the duty would deter treatment.1 8' On the other
to retire prematurely from practice."). But compare Robert D. Miller & Robert
Weinstock, Conflict of Interest Between Therapist-PatientConfidentiality and
the Duty to Report Sexual Abuse of Children, 5 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 161, 168 (1987),
discussing Givelber, supra note 5 (surveyed clinicians had not decreased their
contact with potentially violent patients as a result of Tarasoff).
177. Brodsky, supra note 100, at 493; see also Appelbaum, supra note 166, at
429.
178. ROBERT SIMON, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW xxiv (1987); see generally Kaufman, supra note 51, at 320.
179. Brown & Rayne, supra note 140, at 539-40.
180. See Johnson, supra note 61, at 255-56, discussing, inter alia, Tarasoff,
551 P.2d at 346 n.12; Currie v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 1074, 1082 (M.D.N.C.
1986), aff'd 836 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Thomas A. Goodman, From
Tarasoff to Hopper: The Evolution of the Therapist's Duty to Protect Third
Parties, 3 BEHAV. SC. & L. 195, 219 (1985) ("There has been creditable evidence
either that the practice of psychotherapy has suffered or that violence within our
society has increased because of the imposition of the duty to protect others upon
the mental health professions").
181. See Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Center, 529 N.E.2d
449, 459 n.20 (Ohio 1988) (discussing Stone, supra note 54). The patient in Lit-
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hand, one of the most expansive readings of Tarasoff buttressed its
holding by relying upon survey results in which psychotherapists
self-reported that they could accurately predict dangerousness,' s2
notwithstanding the "overwhelming academic and empirical evidence to the contrary." ' The fact remains that there is no reliable
database of empirical evidence as to the therapeutic value of
84
Tarasoff warnings or of the case's ultimate "real life" impact.1
Finally, this commentary must be read in the context of other
literature that has looked broadly at malpractice litigation (and in
a more focused manner at suits brought against psychotherapists)
in an effort to determine their impact on the quality of therapy
provided to patients, 8 5 and that has begun to question whether
the so-called "explosion" in malpractice litigation is myth or reality. 8 6 Thus, we need to carefully consider Richard Bonnie's contleton was a voluntary in-patient who "did not manifest violent propensities while
being hospitalized." Id. at 460.
182. Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Wis. 1988).
183. Note, supra note 39, at 279. See also Rubenstein, supra note 77, at 815
(Clinicians have regularly persuaded courts to defer to their predictive judgments); see supra note 77.
184. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 164, at 425; Leong et al., supra note
74, at 734.
185. On the impact of malpractice litigation in general, see, e.g., David S.
Starr, Does Malpractice Litigation Deter Substandard Care?, 37 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 360, 379 (1991) (study indicates that threat of malpractice litigation is
"less instrumental" in preventing negligent care than had been supposed). On the
impact of malpractice litigation against mental health professionals, see Bonnie,
supra note 73, at 234-36 ("[T]hreat of liability [likely] does exert a significant
behavioral effect in those situations where the standard of care is ambiguous, or is
subject to professional disagreement" litigation may have substantial educational
value because it attracts attention to issues of clinical practice that might otherwise have not been noted). Cf. Schopp & Wexler, supra note 157, at 184:
"[C]oncern about tort liability can undermine the ordinary clinician's devotion to
both the fiduciary duty and the therapeutic project when conflicts occur between
the standard of care for tort liability and the conduct likely to promote effective
therapy."
186. See Perlin, supra note 63, at 122-24 (The general perception of a litigation explosion is "deeply flawed" on a variety of important bases); see also
sources cited id. at 122-23 nn.90, 94. For an overview of recent issues, see Peter E.
Herzog, The Reform of Medical Liability: Tort Law or Insurance, 38 AM. J. COMP.
L. 99 (Supp. 1990). On recent empirical surveys suggesting low rates of malpractice filings, see Winsor C. Schmidt et al., Factors Associated With Medical Malpractice: Results From A Pilot Study, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL. 157, 160
nn.17-20 (1991) (citing studies); Randy Otto & Winsor Schmidt, Malpractice in
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clusion that, "To the extent that Tarasoff litigation has spurred
mental health professionals to think systematically about these
clinical problems, it has made a beneficial contribution to the qual187
ity of care received by these patients.
There is truly a broad array of topics here for scholars to examine carefully:' 8 8 the impact of "litigaphobia"' 89 (and what may
Verbal Psychotherapy: Problems and Potential Solutions, 4 FORENSIC

REPORTS

309, 314 (1991) (same), and id. (psychologists appear to be at lower risk than
psychiatrists for malpractice suits). At least one commentator, however, has asserted an explicit causal relationship between an "upsurge" of litigation against
psychiatrists and the Tarasoff decision. See Menninger, supra note 50, at 205.
Another has speculated as to the relationship between Tarasoff liability and clinicians' increased difficulties in obtaining professional malpractice insurance. See
Geske, supra note 61, at 401 n.59 (discussing Martha King, Are Therapists Liable
for Their Patients' Violence? STATE LEGISLATURES, Feb. 1988, at 19).

On decisionmaking in jury verdicts in such cases, see Stephen Daniels, Tracing the Shadow of Law: Jury Verdicts in Medical Malpractice Cases, 14 JUST.

Sys. J. 4 (1990).
187. Bonnie, supra note 73, at 236. See also id. at 238 ("[Tlhe increased risk
of iatrogenic injury, and therefore of a lawsuit, is perhaps a necessary side effect
of highly beneficial advances in the quality of care, no less in mental health care
than in other areas of health care."). But see Robert D. Miller et al., Psycho
Therapists' Duty to Prevent ForeseeableHarm: Schuster v. Altenberg, (In Opposition to Schuster: A Call for Legislative Action), 62 Wis. LAW 10, 68 (May 1989)
(criticizing courts for "ignor[ing] the considerable emotional trauma and loss of

professional time and reputation suffered by defendants" in Tarasoff-type suits).
188. Compare Perlin, supra note 124, at 54 (making similar suggestion in
context of right to refuse treatment law).
189. See Brodsky, supra note 100, at 497; Francis A. Breslin et al., Developments of a Litigaphobia Scale: Measurement of Excessive Fear of Litigation, 58
L. Brodsky, Litigaphobia: A Profes-

PSYCHOLOG. REPORTS 547 (1986); Stanley
sional Disease, 28 CONTEMP. PSYCHOL. 204

(1983). Elsewhere, Brodsky defines "litigaphobia" as the "excessive and irrational fear of litigation." Brodsky, supra
note 100, at 497 (discussing Stanley L. Brodsky, A Case Report of Litigaphobic
Release From an Involuntary Commitment, 2 PUB. SERV. PSYCHOL. 11 (1983)). See
also SIMON, supra note 178, at xxiv-xxv (discussing "iatrogenic liability
neurosis").
Decisions of therapists to not ask patients certain questions (for fear of the
answers that might be provided), see Wise, supra note 56, at 186-88, or to not
treat certain types of patients, see Appelbaum, supra note 61, at 821, certainly fit
into this paradigm. See also Appelbaum, supra note 65, at 785 (fear of being sued
can "incapacitate" clinicians). As to the degree of fear felt in this context, there is
little doubt. See Appelbaum, supra note 61, at 821 ("[It appears clear that no
court decision in the last generation has succeeded in so raising the anxieties of
mental health professionals.").
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again simply be a rarified form of passive-aggressive behavior) 190
on mental health professionals caused by decisions imposing
Tarasoff liability; 91 the implications of "critogenesis" (meaning
the "inherent risks of legal intervention in medical decisionmaking")1 92 in Tarasoff litigation; the degree to which some clinicians
may be "willfully blinding"' 93 themselves to information about
their patients in an effort to avoid liability; and the extent to
which courts are even willing to consider the underlying social science data.9 We have not even skimmed the surface of these important investigations. If we take the notion of "therapeutic jurisprudence" seriously and begin to turn our attention to these and
other similar questions, it would illuminate the underlying issues
for judicial decisionmakers, clinicians and other scholars alike.
V.

CONCLUSION

1 95

There is no dispute as to the controversy or confusion
spawned by the Tarasoff decision and its progeny. Its very existence has reshaped the configurations of mental health practice,
and has altered the relationship between clinicians and public authorities. It has been responsible for legislative debate and statu190. See, e.g., Julie Magna Zito et al., One Year Under Rivers: Drug Refusal
in a New York State Psychiatric Facility, 12 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 295 (1989).
191. In at least one case, a court has spoken to this fear, and has dismissed
the concern, indicating that the fear misinterprets the therapist's duty. See Lipari
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 192 (D. Neb. 1980), discussed in Johnson, supra note 61, at 256. The extent to which this type of court statement can
assuage such fears is far from clear.
192. Thomas G. Gutheil et al., Participationin Competency Assessment and
Treatment Decisions: The Role of the Psychiatrist-Attorney Team, 11 MENT. &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 446, 449 (1987).
193. See Perlin, supra note 146, at 35-36; see Joel J. Finer, Gates, Leon, and
the Compromise of Adjudicative Fairness (Part II): Of Aggressive Majoritarianism, Willful Deafness and the New Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 34 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 199, 205 (1986).
194. See generally Perlin, supra note 146, at 53-61; Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense,"
Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 131, 136-37 (1991) (discussing teleology of courts in weighing social science
data).
195. For an excellent and thoughtful analysis of the ways that therapists can
ethically (and therepeutically) reduce their Tarasoff exposure, see John Monahan,
Limiting Therapist Exposure to Tarasoff Liability: Guidelines for Risk Containment, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST (forthcoming 1992).
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tory amendment in a significant number of states, including some
in which Tarasoff-type issues have never been litigated. 196 The extent to which it is both known and materially misunderstood assures maintenance and continuation of its symbolic, shaman-like
status. The fact that clinicians self-report changes in their therapeutic approach (because of fear, real or imagined, of Tarasoff-inspired legal liability) attests to the dominance of its image.
While other courts will doubtlessly tinker with its boundaries,
extending or narrowing its holding based on the fact-specific circumstances,197 these new decisions will not add that much to the
dilemma facing mental health professionals (save for adding an extra level of confusion as more state-,by-state variations occur). We
can also be confident that each of these decisions will be the subject of careful and meticulous doctrinal analysis.
In summary, many of the important issues in Tarasoff have
been the subject of far too little academic scrutiny. The impact of
heuristic thinking on Tarasoff decisionmaking (and on clinician response to Tarasoff), the complex therapeutic jurisprudential implications of the decision, the paucity of empirical data bases upon
which litigators, lawmakers, and judges can draw: these are areas
crying out for new research, new ideas, and new reforms. It is to
these questions that our attention must now turn.

196. See McClarren, supra note 4, at 289-90 n.103 (discussing, inter alia, legislative amendments in New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:22 (Supp.
1988)); and Geske, supra note 61, at 407 n.88 (discussing, inter alia, legislative
amendments in Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14a-102(1) (Supp. 1988)). No "duty
to protect" case has been litigated in either jurisdiction.
197. For a recent meta-analysis of the legal process from this perspective, see
J. M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197 (1990).

